

Message Text

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ACTION SY-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ABF-01 A-01 SS-15 SCCT-01 SIG-01

CIAE-00 EB-07 USIA-06 SCA-01 PPT-01 VO-03 SCS-03

AID-05 OC-05 CCO-00 DODE-00 FBO-02 /070 W

----- 122672

R 251733Z SEP 75

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5087

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ASEC

SUBJECT: SECURITY PROTECTION AFFORDED PUBLIC ACCESS
AREAS OF EMBASSY

REF: A) STATE 210312

B) LONDON A-391, MAY 1, 1974

1. SUMMARY: THE PUBLIC ACCESS AREAS OF THE EMBASSY ARE VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST PENETRATION. THEIR SECURITY COULD BE INCREASED BY THE INSTALLATION OF ELECTRONIC SCREENING DEVICES AT ALL THREE GROUND FLOOR ENTRANCES, THE INSTALLATION OF A SPECIAL ALARM SYSTEM, THE HIRING AND TRAINING OF ADDITIONAL GUARD/RECEPTIONISTS, AND THE ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL MARINES. END SUMMARY.
2. IN RESPONSE TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FY-74 ANTI-TERRORISM BUDGET AMENDMENT, A NUMBER OF MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN OR ARE BEING TAKEN TO ENHANCE THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE EMBASSY. THESE INCLUDE SPECIAL REMOTE ELEVATOR CONTROL SWITCHES, THE INSTALLATION OF WINDOW GRILLES AROUND THE LOWER GROUND FLOOR, THE APPLICATION OF MYLAR PLASTIC TO WINDOWS ON THE FIRST FOUR FLOORS, THE INSTALLATION OF A MOTORIZED STEEL DOOR GRILLE AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE LOWER GROUND GARAGE, THE TRANSFER OF THE DISPATCHER'S OFFICE TO THE ENTRANCE OF THE BASEMENT

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GARAGE ENTRANCE FOR BETTER VISUAL CONTROL, AND THE

ASSIGNMENT TO THE EMBASSY OF TWO ADDITIONAL MARINES AND TWO ADDITIONAL CIVILIAN GUARD/RECEPTIONISTS.

3. AS A RESULT OF THESE AND EARLIER PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES, WE BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST FLOOR AND ALL FLOORS ABOVE ARE MORE SECURE AGAINST A TERRORIST PENETRATION THAN PREVIOUSLY. THE SEMI-PUBLIC AREAS OF THE EMBASSY ON THE GROUND FLOOR, HOWEVER, CONTAINING THE CONSULAR SECTION, THE USIS LIBRARY AND OTHER USIS OFFICES, AN IRS OFFICE, AND THE US NAVY DISPENSARY REMAIN VULNERABLE TO ATTACK. (FOR A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PHYSICAL LAYOUT OF THE EMBASSY, SEE REF B.)

4. CONSIDERING THE LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE WHO VISIT THE EMBASSY (OVER 300,000 ANNUALLY FOR CONSULAR SERVICES ALONE), MAXIMUM PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC ACCESS AREAS IS BOUND TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE THAN PROTECTION OF THE UPPER FLOORS, AND WILL IN ANY EVENT HAVE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION IMPORTANT OPERATIONAL AND PUBLIC RELATIONS REQUIREMENTS. AT A MINIMUM WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL MEASURES COULD BE TAKEN:

A) TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRESENT GROUND FLOOR RECEPTION DESK INTO A COMMAND POST MANNED EXCLUSIVELY BY MARINES, AND CONTAINING ELEVATOR CONTROLS, CLOSED CIRCUIT TV SURVEILLANCE OF THE ENTIRE OUTSIDE OF THE BUILDING AND ALL ENTRANCES, AND A SPECIALIZED EMBASSY-WIDE ALARM SYSTEM.

B) TRANSFER OF THE MAIN ENTRANCE RECEPTION DESK IN LOBBY TO A LOCATION NEARER PUBLIC ENTRANCE AND MANNING IT SOLELY BY CIVILIAN GUARD/RECEPTIONISTS.

C) INSTALLATION AT ALL THREE GROUND FLOOR ENTRANCES OF ELECTRONIC SCREENING DEVICES SIMILAR TO THOSE USED AT AIRPORTS. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE MANNED BY WELL-TRAINED LOCAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES SENSITIVE TO THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECTS OF THEIR WORK. THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF REQUIRING VISITORS TO THE EMBASSY TO SUBMIT THEIR HANDBAGS AND BRIEFCASES FOR INSPECTION IS NOT ADEQUATE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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TO PREVENT SURREPTITIOUS SMUGGLING OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES INTO CHANCERY.

D) ESTABLISHMENT OF ONE MARINE POST AT EACH GROUND FLOOR ENTRANCE DURING WORKING HOURS PLUGGED INTO EMBASSY-WIDE ALARM SYSTEM, IN ADDITION TO THE TWO MARINES WHO PRESENTLY TOUR THE BUILDING. THIS WOULD ENTAIL THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL EIGHT MARINES TO EMBASSY

LONDON.

5. THE FLOORS BELOW THE PUBLIC ACCESS AREAS ARE ALSO
VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST ATTACK, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY LESS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5088

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SO THAN THE GROUND FLOOR. NEW PHYSICAL DEVICES AND
TIGHTENED ACCESS PROCEDURES SHOULD DIMINISH THE LIKELI-
HOOD OF A SUCCESSFUL ARMED PENETRATION OF THESE AREAS.
THEY DO REMAIN VULNERABLE, HOWEVER, TO BOMBS PLANTED IN
OR UNDER THE VEHICLES DRIVEN IN AND OUT OF THE GARAGES
EVERY DAY. ONE WAY TO GUARD AGAINST THIS WOULD BE TO
ASSIGN ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO CHECK ALL INCOMING
VEHICLES FOR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

6. IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO CONTROL ACCESS TO THE
BOILER ROOM IN THE SUB-BASEMENT MORE CLOSELY ALONG THE
LINES LAID DOWN IN REF B, PP. 17-18.

7. IT WOULD ALSO BE ADVISABLE TO INSTALL AUTOMATIC
LOCKING DEVICES ON THE DOORS AT THE THREE ENTRANCES TO
THE CONSULAR SECTION LEADING OFF FROM THE MAIN LOBBY.

8. FINALLY, AS A GENERAL PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, IT
WOULD BE USEFUL TO INSTALL A DISTINCTIVE ALARM SYSTEM
THROUGHOUT THE BUILDING TO ALERT ALL EMBASSY PERSONNEL
TO TERRORIST ATTACK AND TO INSTRUCT SAID PERSONNEL IN
WHAT TO DO AND NOT TO DO IN VARIOUS TERRORIST-LINKED
CONTINGENCIES.

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9. N.B. THIS MESSAGE ADDRESSES THE PHYSICAL SECURITY
OF THE CHANCERY ALONE. IT DOES NOT DEAL WITH THE
SECURITY OF EMBASSY PERSONNEL WHILE THEY ARE AWAY FROM
THE CHANCERY NOR DOES IT TOUCH ON THE PHYSICAL SECURITY
OF THE US TRADE CENTER OR THE US TRAVEL SERVICE BOTH OF
WHICH ARE LOCATED ELSEWHERE IN THE CITY AND MUST BE
RECKONED VULNERABLE TO TERRORIST ATTACK.

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